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CHAPTER 15
What Should Be Our Human Capital 
Investment Policy?
James J. Heckman
While we did not always or even often agree on matters of economic 
policy, Sar Levitan and I exchanged views on both economic policy 
and econometric methodology. On several occasions, we discussed the 
changing labor market for unskilled labor and what the proper role was 
for government policy. This paper records my side of our conversa 
tions. I make six points.
First, I discuss the magnitude of the human resource problem con 
fronting the American economy and the size of investments required to 
solve the problem. Second, I comment on the general ineffectiveness 
of current government training policies. Third, I comment on the gen 
eral effectiveness of private sector training. Fourth, I discuss the con 
flict between economic efficiency and pursuit of the work ethic. Fifth, I 
consider a broader array of policy options including extensions of the 
tax code and revisions of educational subsidies. Finally, I distinguish 
between the long view and the short view in approaching human 
resource problems.
Presently, the economy has a large group of unskilled workers, 
many of whom can be trained to be skilled labor only at a prohibitively 
expensive cost. In an era of tight budgets, it is far from obvious that 
investments in such workers are justified on any but political grounds. 
The real cost of such investment is the diversion of investment away 
from the young and the more trainable for whom a human capital strat 
egy is likely to be more effective and for whom it is likely to produce 
favorable outcomes in the long run. Missing from most discussions of
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job training is any discussion of the rather convincing evidence that 
investment is most profitable when it is made in the young.
Also, missing from current discussions is any consideration of prior 
ities or the need to prioritize. In an era of tight government budgets, it 
is impractical to consider active investment programs for all persons. 
The real question is how to use available funds wisely. Government 
investments have not been shown to be effective in any meaningful 
cost/benefit sense for severely disadvantaged adults or older workers. 
For these groups, wage subsidies may be more effective tools for keep 
ing persons employed than skill investment programs. The available 
evidence supports the policy proscription: Invest in the young; subsi 
dize the old and the severely disadvantaged.
There is also a strong presumption in current discussions that invest 
ment in persons should be supplied by the government sector. This 
leads scholars of human resource problems to ignore a potentially 
important role for tax incentives in encouraging training by private 
firms to raise the demand and wages of labor. The evidence suggests 
that the returns to firm-supplied investment in human capital are larger 
than the returns to government training. This alone would justify 
greater reliance on the public sector. However, the better performance 
of private firms may be due to the lower skill level of trainees in the 
government programs. Evidence of their lower skills does not vindi 
cate continued investment in such persons. No investment may be the 
best short-run strategy for low-skill adults, contrary to a central 
implicit premise of current job training strategies.
The New American Labor Market
There is much evidence to support the view that wage gaps have 
widened across the skill levels. In purchasing-power-constant or 
deflated dollars, male high school graduates earned 4 percent less per 
week in 1989 than in 1979. Male high school dropouts earned 13 per 
cent less per week than in 1979. In contrast, male college graduates 
earned 11 percent more per week (Blank 1994). These comparisons 
widen further if we consider annual earnings. By any measure, labor 
incomes for men have become more unequally distributed. For women,
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the story is somewhat different. The real weekly earnings of female 
high school graduates have risen but the rise has been even greater for 
female college graduates.
For both men and women, inequality of labor incomes has risen. 
The returns to schooling and skill have increased. The relative earnings 
of workers at the bottom of the skill distribution (less than high school 
graduate) have definitely declined for persons of either gender. Youth 
have been hit hardest in the shifting market for skills.
A corollary phenomenon is the decline in labor market activity, 
especially among the unskilled. Labor force measures show increasing 
joblessness and longer unemployment spells for workers at "all skill 
levels. Particularly problematic are less-skilled youth (those with high 
school education or less) who appear to flounder in the market for 
years before they find stable jobs. These youth are a source of major 
social problems. Teenage pregnancy, crime, and idleness are on the 
increase in most areas. It is very likely that diminished labor market 
opportunities for youth help to create these problems.
The problem of a deteriorating market for unskilled or semiskilled 
workers is not solely a problem of youth. Displaced adults, primarily 
factory workers, are a major concern. Middle-age workers displaced 
from high-wage jobs are at a major disadvantage in the new market for 
labor that has emerged since many of these workers first took their 
jobs. Displaced workers constitute 10-20 percent of the unemployed, 
or roughly 1 to 2 million workers. Recent evidence on the patterns of 
earnings losses experienced by workers displaced by mass layoffs sug 
gests that the losses are significant and long-lasting, especially for 
those previously employed in unionized industries or occupations 
(Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 1993).
The Level of Investment Needed to Reduce the Current Levels 
of Wage Inequality
There have been many proposals for investments in human capital 
designed to increase the wage levels of the less-skilled. An investment 
generally yields returns over many years after initial costs are incurred. 
For human capital, a round, and roughly correct, average rate of return
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is 10 percent. Thus, for each $10 invested in a person, the expected 
annual return is $1. Some claim that this number is lower and some 
claim that it is higher, but most economists would accept a 10 percent 
return as a good starting point for estimating the aggregate investment 
needed to upgrade the skills of the low-skilled segment of the work 
force.
At this rate of return, to add $1,000 in earnings per year to the aver 
age person it is necessary to make a one-time investment of $10,000 in 
that person. Using a 10 percent rate, the investment needed to reduce 
any wage gap is ten times the amount of the gap.
To put the magnitude of recent developments in the labor market in 
perspective, consider the following two questions:
1. How much would we have to invest in our workforce in 1989 dol 
lars to restore real earnings of male high school dropouts and 
graduates to their real 1979 levels?
This question is meaningful only for men because real weekly earnings 
for women have risen or remained roughly constant over the period 
1979-1989. A second question is:
2. How much would we have to invest in our workforce in 1989 
dollars to restore 1979 earnings ratios between lower-education 
groups and college graduates, without reducing the 1989 earn 
ings of college graduates?
Using a 10 percent rate of return, it would require an investment of 
$25,000 in each high school dropout or a staggering $214 billion in 
1989 dollars to restore male high school dropouts participating in the 
workforce to their 1979 real earnings level. To restore all high school 
graduates to their real 1979 levels would take an investment of $10,000 
per high school graduate, or more than $212 billion 1989 dollars, for a 
total of $426 billion in 1989 dollars.
The answer to question 2 is even larger. Table 1 shows the amount 
needed to restore the 1979 earnings ratio between high school gradu 
ates or high school dropouts and college-educated full-time workers 
over age 25. To restore real earnings for both male and female workers 
over age 25 who are high school-educated or less to their 1979 relative 
positions with respect to college graduates (holding the latter at 1989 
real wage levels) would require an investment of more than 1.66 tril-
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lion dollars. These cost estimates are optimistic because they do not 
consider persons below age 25 or persons who do not participate in the 
workforce at the current wage levels. They are also optimistic for 
another reason: few, if any, government training programs have returns 
anywhere near 10 percent. Zero percent is a much closer approxima 
tion to the true return.
One might wish to qualify these calculations in many ways. One 
might want to adjust down the rate of return as more difficult-to-train 
persons receive training. Or, one might wish to account for the fact that 
as persons have their skills upgraded, the real wages of the lower-skill 
workers are likely to increase as they become more scarce and the real 
wages of those with higher skills are likely to decrease as their supply 
increases. Still, under most plausible scenarios, the costs of restoring 
skill parities to their 1979 levels are huge.
Investment in human capital may still not reduce income inequality. 
Raising the skills of a few need not reduce overall inequality. By mov 
ing some workers from low-skill to high-skill status, some standard 
measures of earnings inequality might actually increase. Many pro 
grams train only the high end among the low-skill workers. Such train 
ing efforts could polarize the labor market. In addition, it takes skilled 
labor to produce skilled labor. A large-scale increase in training activ 
ity might therefore increase earnings inequality in the short run since it 
would further expand the demand for skilled labor to train the 
unskilled labor.
Finally, the most efficient training policy may not be to train the 
unskilled. As first noted by Jacob Mincer (1962), there is strong evi 
dence that those who complete more school invest more in postschool 
training. It may be economically efficient to invest in higher-skilled 
workers and to alleviate concerns about income and earnings inequal 
ity through income transfers or through wage subsidies. However, to 
the extent that working fosters socially desirable values among those 
who work, it may still be desirable to invest inefficiently or subsidize 
the employment of low-skill workers in order to promote those values.
328 What Should Be Our Human Capital Investment Policy?
Table 1. Investment in Human Capital Required to Restore Earnings to 
1979 Levels and to Restore 1979 Relative Wage Ratios Using a 
10 Percent Rate of Return 
(in billions of dollars)
To Restore Earnings to 1979 Levels
Males
Investment needed to restore average male high school dropout 
earnings in 1989 to average real earnings of male high school 
dropouts in 1979
Investment needed to restore average male high school graduate 






To Restore 1979 Earnings Ratios
Males
Investment needed to restore average male high school dropout 
earnings in 1989 to the level needed to achieve the 1979 high 
school dropout/college earnings ratio (holding 1989 college 
graduate wages fixed)
Investment needed to restore average male high school graduate 
earnings in 1989 to the level needed to achieve the 1979 high 





Investment needed to restore average female high school dropout 
earnings in 1989 to the level needed to achieve the 1979 high 
school dropout/college earnings ratio (holding 1989 college 
graduate wages fixed)
Investment needed to restore average female high school graduate 
earnings in 1989 to the level needed to achieve the 1979 high 






SOURCE: Wages are from Blank (1994).
NOTE We assume workers work 50 weeks a year The figures on the educational breakdown for 
the labor force are from Table #616, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1992 We delete all 
persons out of the labor force and those less than age 25. On these criteria, our estimated invest 
ment costs are downward-biased
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The Ineffectiveness of Public Training Programs
In this section, I examine the evidence concerning the rate of return 
to government training. The evidence suggests that the 10 percent rate 
of return assumed in the above,calculations is wildly optimistic. Few 
programs earn anywhere near this return.
The Summer Youth Employment and Training Program
It has been proposed that the Summer Youth Employment and Train 
ing program under the Job Training Partnership Act be increased. The 
stated purpose of this program is to preserve and upgrade the skills of 
low-income youth during the summers between school terms. The new 
twist on this program is that an "investment" argument has been given 
to support it. Barbara Heyns and her associates have argued that 
knowledge acquired in schools deteriorates through disuse during the 
summer (Heyns 1987). The new proposals recognize this possibility 
and suggest that summer youth programs should be enhanced by learn 
ing enrichment activities. What are the prospects for success of this 
program? A recent evaluation of a similar effort, the Summer Training 
and Education Program (STEP), has been presented by Public/Private 
Ventures, a Philadelphia-based nonprofit corporation that evaluates and 
manages social policy initiatives aimed at helping disadvantaged 
youth. STEP offered two summers of employment, academic remedia 
tion, and a life skills program to low-achieving youth ages 14 and 15 
from poor families. The objective of the program was to reach youth at 
the crucial ages at which they are deciding whether or not to drop out 
of school or become pregnant. Part-time summer work at the mini 
mum wage was supplemented with remedial reading and math classes 
and courses on the long-term consequences of drug use, unprotected 
sex, and dropping out of school.
Using randomized trials, 4,800 youth in five cities were enrolled 
into or randomized out of the program. Both treatments and controls 
were followed for eight years. A high quality evaluation was conducted 
using state-of-the-art demonstration methods for three cohorts of par 
ticipants. The findings from this evaluation are disappointing. STEP 
participants experienced measured short-run gains including increases 
of half a grade level in their math and reading competency test scores.
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These gains held up even after 15 months, though gains in the second 
summer were less than those in the first. Especially large was short-run 
growth in knowledge of contraceptive methods.
This short-term promise did not translate into longer-term gains. 
Three-and-a-half years after their STEP experience, at the ages of 17 
and 18, work rates and school completion rates were identical and low 
for treatments and controls. Some 22 percent of young women had 
children and 64 percent of these were receiving public assistance in 
some form (Walker and Viella-Velez 1992).
Since STEP is, if anything, more intensive than the proposed sum 
mer youth programs, this evidence suggests that summer youth pro 
grams are not efficient investments. There is no evidence that they 
have lasting effects on participants. They may protect the peace, pre 
vent riots, and lower the summer crime rate, but there is no firm evi 
dence of such effects.
Evidence About Conventional Workforce Training 
and Work-Welfare Programs
How effective are current programs in moving people from welfare 
to work and in increasing their employment and earnings? Robert 
LaLonde recently addressed this question (LaLonde 1992). His evi 
dence is summarized below along with my own evidence on the Job 
Training Partnership Act (JTPA).
Adult Women
Employment and training programs increase the earnings of adult 
female AFDC recipients. Earnings gains (a) are modest, (b) persist 
over several years, (c) arise from several different treatments, and (d) 
are sometimes quite cost effective. Table 2 displays evaluation results 
for a variety of programs. For example, participation in an Arkansas 
job search program was required for AFDC recipients with children 
over age three. Participants attended a group job search club for two 
weeks and then were asked to search as individuals for an additional 
two months. A program in San Diego required all AFDC participants to 
take job search assistance and mandated work experience. The gains 
were high for participants in both programs. The National Supported 
Work program provided intensive training and job search assistance at
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Table 2. Experimental Estimates of the Impact of Employment and 
Training Programs on the Earnings of Female Welfare 
Applicants and Recipients












San Diego I (EPP/EWEP)























SOURCES Gueron and Pauly (1991, pp. 15-20), Bell et al (1987, 
table 1) 
NOTE All figures in the table are expressed in 1990 dollars. 
*Statistically significant at a 10 percent level. 
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a cost of about $16,550 per recipient. The estimated rate of return to 
this program was only 3.5 percent.
The results from the recent experiment evaluating the Job Training 
Partnership Act (shown in table 3) corroborate these findings. The larg 
est impacts are for adult women, many of whom were collecting AFDC 
during their participation in JTPA. The impacts are not sufficiently 
large to move more than a tiny fraction of women out of poverty. As a 
general rule, conventional employment and training programs are often 
cost effective for adult women (especially if the opportunity cost of 
trainee time is ignored or is sufficiently low), but do not produce dra 
matic changes in participant earnings.
Table 3. Impacts on Total 18-Month Earnings and Employment: JTPA 
Assignees and Enrollees, by Target Group
Adults Out-of school youths






Sample size (assignees 




































SOURCE: Bloom et al (1993) Enrollee estimates obtained using the procedure in Bloom (1984)
a At any time during the follow-up period
b. Tests of statistical significance were not performed for impacts per enrollee.
*Statistically significant at the .10 level, **at the .05 level, ***at the 01 level (two-tailed test).
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Adult Men
The evidence for this group is consistent across programs. Returns 
are low but usually positive. Job search assistance is an effective strat 
egy but produces only modest increases in mean earnings levels. This 
program is worth keeping but I do not think that it will make much of a 
difference in closing the emerging wage gap.
Youth
Evidence from the JTPA experiment indicates that this program pro 
duces only low or negative impacts on earnings. For male youth, the 
estimated negative effect is unbelievably low. If taken seriously, partic 
ipation in JTPA has a more negative impact on the earnings of male 
youth than participation in the Army, loss of work experience, or the 
cost of incarceration as measured by many studies.
Only the Job Corps has a demonstrated positive impact on earnings. 
It is an expensive program, costing around $20,000 per participant, 
with an estimated return of roughly 8-9 percent. There is some basis 
for supporting expansion of this program, but even for this program the 
evidence is weak. The evaluation of Job Corps program is not experi 
mental. Part of the high return comes from the very large value 
imputed to human life and the slightly smaller rate of committing mur 
ders found among persons who participate in the Job Corps. With 
lower values placed on lives saved, the gains from Job Crops tend to 
weaken greatly. (See Donohue and Siegelman 1995).
Workfare and Learnfare
How effective are the recent learnfare and workfare programs? An 
evaluation of two programs conducted in Wisconsin is of interest (see 
Pawasarat and Quinn 1993). One program, the Community Work 
Experience Program (CWEP), required mandatory participation in 
unpaid community service jobs for nonexempt AFDC participants. A 
second program, Work Experience and Job Training, provided AFDC 
clients with assessment, job search activities, subsidized employment, 
job training, and community work experience. Participants who failed 
to find employment after completing their education and training were 
also required to participate in CWEP jobs.
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Using randomized trials for one county and nonexperimental meth 
ods for the rest, researchers found no effect of these programs com 
pared to existing program alternatives. The reduction in AFDC 
participation that is widely cited as a consequence of these programs is 
essentially due to the improvement in the Wisconsin economy during 
the time the programs were in place. These results are disappointing 
but consistent with previous studies of the efficacy of such programs 
by the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (Gueron and 
Pauly 1991). Mandatory work experience programs produce little 
long-term gain. No cheap training solution has yet been found that can 
end the welfare problem. Lifting a welfare woman out of poverty by 
increasing her earnings by $5,000 per year ($100 per week) will cost at 
least $50,000. This is the scale of required investment. No "quick fix," 
low-cost solution is in sight.
Training Programs for Displaced Workers
As noted above, displacement of older workers with substantial 
experience in the labor market has become an increasingly important 
phenomenon in recent years. In response to this trend, Congress passed 
Title III of the Job Training Partnership Act in 1982 and the Economic 
Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance Act in 1988.
Although studies evaluating these programs directly are not avail 
able as yet, evaluations of state-funded programs providing a similar 
mix of services have been conducted. Leigh (1990) summarizes the 
evidence on a variety of these programs. Results from some of these 
evaluations suggest small to moderate wage gains lasting only about a 
year. A more recent evaluation by Mathematica (see Corson et al. 
1993) of training provided under the Trade Adjustment Assistance Act 
to workers displaced as a result of foreign trade finds no evidence of 
any effect of this long-term training program on the earnings and 
employment of recipients. Consistent with the other studies of govern 
ment employment and training programs already discussed, the overall 
pattern for programs aimed at displaced workers is one of weak 
impacts for most groups.
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Private Sector Training
Due to a lack of data and a bias in favor of funding studies of gov 
ernment training, the returns to private sector training are less well 
understood. Studies by Lynch (1992) and Lillard and Tan (1986), find 
sizable effects of private sector training. In comparison with studies of 
public sector training, most of these studies do not attempt to control 
for the likely case that more able persons are more likely to take train 
ing, so the estimated rates of return would overstate the true returns to 
training by combining them with the return to ability. Thus, part of the 
measured return may be due to more motivated and able persons taking 
training. Estimated initial returns range from 10 to 20 percent (Mincer 
1993), but they tend to decline after a few years as technical progress 
renders the training essentially obsolete. To the extent that rapid techni 
cal progress in many fields causes the knowledge obtained through 
training to lose its value after only a few years, fears about the detri 
mental effects of turnover in the labor market on the volume of human 
capital investment may be exaggerated.
An important feature of private sector training is that the more 
skilled do more investing even after they attain high skill levels. Differ 
ent types of training and learning have strong complementarities with 
respect to each other.
Even though the evidence is weak, the direction of the evidence is 
clear. To the extent that effective training can be produced on the job, it 
is produced in the private sector and not in the public sector. The best 
hope of getting reasonable returns from job training is to encourage 
private sector investment.
It is important to note, however, that private sector training typically 
excludes low-skilled persons. Firms can be exclusive in a way that gov 
ernment training programs for disadvantaged workers are designed not 
to be. The lack of interest of private firms in training disadvantaged 
workers indicates the difficulty of the task and the likely low return to 
this activity. Training programs are an inefficient transfer mechanism 
and an inefficient investment policy for low-skill adult workers.
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The Conflict Between Economic Efficiency and the Work Ethic
To the extent that there-are strong complementarities between differ 
ent types of skill investments, there is a conflict between policies that 
seek to alleviate poverty by investing in low-skill workers and policies 
that raise the wealth of society at large. Taking the available evidence 
at face value, the most economically justified strategy for improving 
the incomes of the poor is to invest more in the highly skilled, tax 
them, and then redistribute the tax revenues to the poor. However, 
many people view the work ethic as a basic value and would argue that 
cultivating a large class of transfer recipients would breed a culture of 
poverty and helplessness.
If value is placed on work as an act of individual dignity, because of 
general benefits to families, communities, and society as a whole, then 
all individuals in society may be prepared to subsidize inefficient jobs. 
Job subsidies are not, however, the same as investment subsidies. The 
evidence points strongly to the inefficiency of subsidizing the invest 
ment of low-skill, disadvantaged workers. Investment may have some 
additional nonpecuniary returns. In this case, a purely economic evalu 
ation of investment policies may be inappropriate. If, however, eco 
nomically inefficient investments are to be made, the cost of reducing 
the skill gap grows beyond the already enormous sums presented in 
table 1.
The Quality of the Evidence on Credit Constraints 
and Participation in Schooling and Training Programs
The evidence cited by advocates of training programs that persons 
from low-income families have high rates of return to schooling leads 
them to conclude that credit market restrictions are important factors in 
generating schooling and training outcomes. Another interpretation is 
possible, however. Family income as measured in those studies is a 
proxy for a whole range of background factors not just short-term 
liquidity constraints that might be eased by more generous fellowship 
policies. Persons from poor family backgrounds may attain fewer years
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of schooling because of diminished family motivation for child learn 
ing and because family background may affect the child's learning 
ability. Given diminishing returns to schooling, it is not surprising that 
marginal rates of return are higher for persons who have fewer years of 
school. At issue is what family income really represents. It is signifi 
cant in this regard that Murray and Herrnstein (1994) find that after 
they control for the effects of a score on a combined achievement and 
ability test, measured family income plays only a small role in explain 
ing schooling attainment. It appears that longer-term factors such as 
family background that produce the test score are more important.
Alternative Policy Recommendations: Choice in Schools, Tax 
Policy Wage Subsidies and Antitrust Policy
In the long run, significant improvements in the skill levels of Amer 
ican workers, especially workers not attending college, are unlikely 
without substantial change and improvement in primary and secondary 
education. Mincer's evidence that learning begets learning demon 
strates the value of early training in making subsequent training effec 
tive. Much of the recent discussion about improving postsecondary 
education is misplaced when the value of early schooling is put in con 
text.
Methods for improving primary and secondary education receive 
much attention in current policy discussions but are treated as com 
pletely separate issues in discussions of traditional training programs. 
Increasing the extent of consumer choice in the educational system 
would help to realign incentives in the right way to produce more 
effective schools. Choice among secondary training vendors is an 
important aspect of the German apprenticeship system. (See Heckman, 
Roselius and Smith 1994). Advocates of strong government activity in 
the training area do not consider the failure of governments to provide 
adequate skills to students.
Current tax rules tend to promote human capital formation (see 
Quigley and Smolensky 1990). However, there is much evidence that 
they discriminate against low-skill and disadvantaged workers. Firms 
can immediately write off all of their training expenditures. They do
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not have to be amortized like investments in physical capital. This 
favors investment in human capital over physical capital. In addition, 
training expenditures can include tuition paid by employers for each 
employee up to $5,250 per year, though tuition support is restricted to 
undergraduate level education (U.S. House of Representatives, Joint 
Committee on Taxation 1992). Since many community colleges qual 
ify as undergraduate institutions, there is an incentive for firms to spon 
sor vocational training. The bias in the tax code favors vocational 
training over academic education.
Because tuition paid by employers is exempt from federal personal 
income tax, individuals have an incentive to seek training on the job. 
Additionally, portable vocational or employer-based training can be 
sold to employees by firms and paid for by lower wages. The forgone 
higher earnings are de facto written off on personal income taxes. To 
the extent that direct costs of books and educational materials are paid 
for by lower wages, current tax laws favor on-the-job training activities 
over off-the-job training activities. Thus, they act to shift human capital 
investment activity away from formal schools and toward workplace 
environments.
Conversely, individuals cannot write off direct tuition costs for for 
mal schooling if it is not expressly job-related. Write-offs are not given 
for training in skills useful in other jobs. Thus workers training to 
switch occupations cannot write off their educational expenses for this 
activity. Moreover, there is a floor level of training and education 
expenditures that must be met before persons can write off such self- 
investment activity. To be eligible for this tax break, it is necessary to 
itemize deductions and to incur training costs that exceed 2 percent of 
adjusted gross income. This tax policy likely biases human capital 
accumulation toward vocational over academic training, because voca 
tional training is typically more narrowly defined and justifiable.
Since 1986, persons have been unable to deduct interest on educa 
tional loans from their taxable income. This removes an important 
incentive that promotes investment in human capital of all forms 
(Heckman 1976). However, since mortgage interest is still deductible, 
it is possible for persons with home equity to take out mortgages to 
finance their education or that of their children or to rearrange their 
portfolios toward mortgage debt in order to finance educational loans.
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The tax code for individuals favors human capital accumulation for 
higher income persons (and their children) who itemize their taxes and 
have equity in their homes. Low-income persons who pay no taxes 
receive little encouragement to invest in human capital from the current 
personal tax code. However, firms that employ them may write off 
training expenditures devoted to them. The personal tax code thus 
encourages low-skill workers to make training investments on the job. 
It does not encourage investment in general skills or academic educa 
tion except for company tuition programs. Unfortunately, these pro 
grams (defined under section 127 of the 1988 Tax Code) have not 
received consistent treatment by the tax authorities. In recent years, 
companies have operated under uncertainty whether or not section 127 
would apply to them in a given tax year. Tax policy is an attractive 
option that should receive more discussions in future policy discussion 
about stimulating skill formation.
The evidence on government training programs previously summa 
rized suggests that they can make at best only a modest contribution to 
aggregate human capital formation. Given the strong evidence of com 
plementarity between schooling and training, it may be more efficient 
to focus training on high-skill workers, and then use the tax system to 
transfer resources to the less-skilled through wage subsidies or ineffi 
cient investment. If the goal is to raise their incomes, the extra surplus 
generated through more efficient investment can more than compensate 
low-skilled workers for the training they forgo.
Support of cooperative activity among employers could allow firms 
within an industry to overcome free rider problems in the provision of 
general training by contracting to provide similar levels of industry- 
specific training or general training to their employees. This suggests a 
role for antitrust policy that is rarely mentioned in discussions of train 
ing strategy.
A Life-Cycle Perspective
Economic theory demonstrates that the returns to human capital 
investments are greatest for the young. This is so for two reasons: (1) 
younger persons have a longer horizon over which to recoup the fruits
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of their investments, and (2) skill begets skill. Early learning facilitates 
later learning. At the same level of ability, it pays to invest in the 
young.
Surprisingly little empirical evidence is available on the returns to 
early childhood investments. Early childhood interventions of high 
quality appear to have lasting effects. Despite very small samples, dis- 
advantaged subnormal children randomly assigned to the Perry Pre 
school program have higher earnings and lower levels of pathological 
behavior in their late twenties than do comparable children randomized 
out of the program. (See Schweinhart, Barnes and Weikart 1993). 
Reported cost-benefit ratios are substantial. Evidence on Head Start is 
less clear but the program is quite heterogeneous. These programs do 
not boost IQ but they do appear to foster valuable social skills that 
enhance performance in society at large and in the workplace.
At the same time, skill remediation programs for young adults with 
severe educational disadvantages seem to have negligible effects as do 
training programs for more mature displaced workers. The available 
evidence clearly suggests that adults past a certain age, and below a 
certain skill level make poor investments. Transfers or wage subsidies 
to employers make more sense than investments for such persons.
NOTE
Some of the research reported here was supported by the National Science Foundation and the 
Russell Sage Foundation
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